Abstract-We propose a distributed and low-complexity approximation algorithm to calculate the proportionally fair caching solution for in-network caches. Information-centric networking extensively uses universal in-network caching. However, developing an efficient and fair collaborative caching algorithm for selfish caches is still an open question. In this paper, we address this problem by modelling the in-network caching problem as a Nash bargaining game. We show that the game is a convex optimisation problem and further derive the corresponding distributed optimal solution. Based on the optimal solution, we develop a low-complexity heuristic by taking advantage of both content popularity distribution and network topological properties. The proposed heuristic is consistently superior to the simple greedy strategy and achieves nearly optimal performance but with less communication overhead and faster convergence rate. Our extensive evaluations on the convergence, accuracy, efficiency, cost and sensitivity in various settings exhibit many attractive features of the proposed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) [1] - [3] has been proposed to ameliorate the pressure on current network infrastructures. It replaces the existing end-to-end Internet model with a content request/response model. Many benefits have been suggested, including superior performance, better support for mobility and reduced overheads. A fundamental enabler of these attributes is in-network caching; a feature made far easier via the use of ICN's standardised global content naming. Whereas initial ICN caching studies used traditional algorithms (e.g. Least Recently Used), there has been a flurry of novel proposals that attempt to specifically target ICN environments. These algorithms exploit things like inter-AS collaboration, request prediction and a priori topology maps to optimise performance [4] - [7] .
A key outcome of this work has been the observation that collaborative caching usually outperforms locally optimised algorithms [6] , [8] - [10] . This is primarily caused by the nature of ubiquitous ICN caching, where nearby caches will often wastefully store the same objects [9] . To remdy this, a simple collaborative algorithm between two nodes may involve sharing their resources and strategically caching distinct objects [5] , [11] . There is therefore a convergence towards the need for collaborative algorithms in any future ICN deployments. In tandem, we are witnessing a fragmentation of cache ownership in the live Internet, with large content providers deploying separate infrastructures (e.g. Google, Facebook and Akamai). A more extreme example of this fragmentation is within the expanding number of wireless community mesh networks; these are constructed by groups of individuals who each contribute wireless routers mounted on their property on a city-wide scale. In a community network, every router/cache would be operated by a separate individual. Hence, we predict that future ICNs will use caches that are provisioned not just by network operators, but also various distinct stakeholders at strategic in-network locations. These observations, however, have the potential to undermine the key tenets of caching in ICNs: What if caches operated by separate entities pursue different policies that do not include collaboration, the storage of competitor's content or the serving of specific users? As of yet, nearly every ICN collaborative algorithm proposed has assumed fully cooperative nodes [5] , [6] , [9] - [12] .
The reasons why a non-collaborative policy may be implemented on a cache are diverse. However, in this paper, we explore this topic from a utilitarian perspective. Intuitively, caches will cooperate in a collaborative algorithm if they attain greater utility than if they were not to cooperate. This observation mandates some concept of fairness, where caches are not penalised for collaborating. Imagine, for instance, the above community network example; an individual who sees their own performance consistently detrimented by collaboration would (rationally) cease. We therefore argue that collaboration should be based on fairness, which may or may not reduce global performance. While a global optimum sounds attractive, we argue it is more important, from a practical perspective, that every node is better off by collaborating together than working alone.
In this paper, we focus on designing a collaborative caching algorithm which embraces both high performance and fairness. Specifically, our contributions are as follows
• We formulate the in-network caching problem as a Nash bargaining game. The Nash solution guarantees provable Pareto efficiency and proportional fairness.
• We solve the in-network caching game with convex optimisation techniques, and point out that the optimal distributed solution suffers from high traffic overhead.
• By taking advantage of content popularity distribution and network topology, we develop a low-complexity heuristic to approximate the optimal solution.
• We evaluate thoroughly the convergence, accuracy, efficiency, cost and sensitivity of the proposed heuristic in various settings. The results show that the heuristic can achieve nearly optimal performance with small cost. A mini caching system consists of two caches. Each cache can hold only one object. The demands are different on the two caches as given in a demand matrix. The individual utility is calculated as a function of the amount of local demands satisfied. The utility gained due to the neighbour's help is penalised by a factor 0.5 due to transmitting cost, latency and etc. U T otal represents the aggregated utility in the whole caching system. Similarly, U 1 and U 2 represent the utilities of cache 1 and cache 2 respectively. Three caching strategies (Greedy, Global and Fair) are presented.
II. MOTIVATION AND SYSTEM MODEL

A. Motivational Example
We use the toy caching system described in Figure 1 as a motivating example. Imagine two caches with a capacity of 1 object. They both serve a nearby set of users and, consequently, it is desirable that they collaborate to decide which objects should be cached (e.g. to avoid storing the same object twice). To decide which object to store, the caches inspect the request rates they receive, also depicted in Figure 1 (as a Demand Matrix). Ideally, each cache would store the object they receive the greatest number of requests for. We measure their utility by the number of cache hit they get; if a cache hit is attained at the other cache, a utility of 0.5 is given (factored down due to the extra delay, overhead etc.). We next describe possible caching strategies:
Case 1: Greedy strategy, where each cache attempts to locally and selfishly optimise its performance. Cache 1 chooses to hold A since it is the most popular content of demand 90, which leads to U 1 = 90 + 31 2 = 105.5. Similarly, Cache 2 caches B which leads to U 2 = 83 + 5 2 = 85.5. Therefore, we have the aggregated utility U T otal = U 1 +U 2 = 105.5+85.5 = 191.
Case 2: Global strategy, where each cache tries to maximise the aggregated utility U T otal of the whole system. By caching C and D on Cache 1 and 2 respectively, the aggregated utility reaches its theoretical maximum, namely U T otal = 126+85 = 211. However, if we examine the individual performance of each cache and compare them to the greedy strategy, we notice that the increase in utility for Cache 1 results in a utility decrease for Cache 2.
Case 3: Fair strategy, where caches attempt to collaborate in a way that does not reduce utility for any party (i.e. Pareto efficient). In this case, Cache 1 stores E and Cache 2 stores F . Although this does not achieve the global optimal (i.e. the aggregated utility U T otal drops from 211 to 208.5), it ensures that both caches improve their respective performance whilst also improving upon the greedy strategy.
Looking at the above reveals a stark mismatch that must be balanced. Attaining a global optimum will usually disadvantage some parties, which will clearly disincentivise uptake. We therefore argue that ubiquitous caching should balance the need for high performance against the criticality of fair use of resources. The rest of the paper explores this topic.
B. System Model
We assume a network whose topology can be represented as a graph, G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. We follow a CCN [1] model, whereby hosts generate requests that get routed to sources that reply with content objects. Each node in the network, v i ∈ V , is equipped with cache of size C i . We denote O as the global set of content objects. For each o k ∈ O, we associate two parameters: s k , which is the object size and w i,k , which it its aggregate demand (e.g. requests per second) observed from all the clients connected to v i .
Within this paper, we focus on a subcategory of caching mechanisms: collaborative algorithms. These involve nearby routers cooperating to decide what to store between them, creating a larger logical cache. Because of resource constraints, we assume that nodes are limited in the number of neighbours they can cooperate with. We use r i to represent v i 's search radius measured in hops. r i uniquely defines a neighbourhood for each v i , which we denote as N i = {v j |l * i,j ≤ r i , ∀v j ∈ V, v i = v j }, where l * i,j measures the length of the shortest path between v i and v j .
Thus, a collaborative caching algorithm can be decomposed into "caching decisions" and "retrieval decisions". These two parts solve "what to cache" and "where to fetch", respectively. The latter is necessary to allow nodes to redirect requests to other caches that have agreed to store objects on their behalf. To model such a caching strategy, we use two vector decision variables: x and y. x i,k ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether v i caches o k , and y i,j,k ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether v i retrieves the object o k from v j . Because a caching strategy is essentially a mapping which, by definition, can be viewed as a function of its subscript, we have the following definitions: Definition 1. A caching strategy for a network G is a tuple of functions (x, y) where x : V × O → {0, 1} and y : V × V × O → {0, 1}. The family of all such tuples is denoted as Ψ, which represents the whole space of all caching strategies. Definition 2. A caching strategy for a node v i is defined as (x i , y i ), where x i : {v i } × O → {0, 1} and y i : {v i } × V × O → {0, 1} are the partial functions of x and y with domains restricted to {v i } × O and {v i } × V × O respectively.
Note that "×" above represents the Cartesian product. Throughout the paper, bold font refers to vectors and normal font refers to scalars. From a practical perspective, we consider a collaborative caching strategy good if (i) Pareto efficiency is achieved in the collaboration; and (ii) There is well-defined fairness achieved among the nodes. These two requirements are proposed based on the following considerations. First, to incentivise cooperation, it is vital that nodes are treated fairly and not expected to sacrifice their own performance to benefit others. Second, as system resources are scarce and valuable, being Pareto efficient guarantees no system resource is wasted (although a Pareto efficient solution may not be unique in vector optimisation). Devising a scheme that maximises efficiency without hurting individual contributors is therefore critical.
III. FUNDAMENTALS OF BARGAINING GAMES
A bargaining game is a game theoretical model for analysing how players collaborate to obtain certain utility values. Here, we model collaborative caching as a bargaining game, which we aim to solve such that both high utility and fairness are achieved. Ideally, a solution is considered fair if it satisfies certain axioms as follows: (i) Pareto optimality; (ii) Scale invariance; (iii) Symmetry; (iv) Independence of the irrelevant alternatives; (v) Monotonicity [13] , [14] . Nash proved in [13] that there is one unique solution which satisfies axiom (1)-(4) and referred to it as the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). On the other hand, the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution (KS) in [14] satisfies axiom (1)-(3) and (5). These two solutions lead to two fairness metrics. Compared to NBS, KS often does not have a closed-form expression. In this paper, we focus on NBS.
A. Game Definitions
Concretely, utility for a node, U i , can be considered as the delay to respond to a request. Serving a request from the local cache clearly produces the greatest utility, but redirecting a request to another nearby neighbour also increase utility (rather than forwarding to the origin source). As such, a selfish cache strives to maximise its utility through a combination of local caching and redirects to nearby (low cost) neighbours. Of course, if utility can be maximised solely through local caching then a node will cease to collaborate. NBS is an axiomatic solution for solving the following optimisation problem
Eq. (1) is called the Nash product. As mentioned, U i is node i's utility. u 0 i is the initial disagreement value of i. The disagreement value is defined as the worst payoff a node would accept: any value lower than that will break down the negotiation. In practice, a node sets its disagreement value to the maximum value achieved by optimising locally as a standalone cache, e.g. using LRU or LFU algorithms. In the following, we give the formal definition of our in-network caching game and its solution. Let Ω e ⊂ Ω be the Pareto frontier of set Ω, i.e. the potential Pareto efficient solutions. We assume that Ω e is also a concave function with a closed compact convex domain. A game is considered fair iff its outcome is fair. Therefore, we have: 
B. Fairness Definitions
To measure the fairness of a caching algorithm, it is necessary to first define a metric. Three well-defined fairness metrics are often referred to in the literature [15] - [17] , i.e. Egalitarian (EF), Max-min (MF), and Proportional (PF) fairness. EF pursues an equal amount of improvement on every node, which usually creates Pareto inefficiency (and is therefore seldom used in practice). Both MF and PF are widely used in traffic engineering. MF is a generalisation of KS, while PF is a generalisation of NBS.
Let T : R n → R n be the sorting operator used in [18] , more precisely, that is, We say u is lexicographically larger than or equal to u if we can write u lex u ⇐⇒ u i ≥ u i , ∀i ∈ [0, n). lex can be similarly defined. If we let u * be the corresponding utilities achieved by using (x * , y * ) which fulfils a certain well-defined fairness. Let u w i denote the minimum utility of v i . Technically, we have the following definitions of the three fairness metrics.
The original PF used in traffic engineering [15] differs from definition 7 by dropping u 0 i (disagreement value) in the formula. It can therefore can be viewed as a special case with u 0 i = 0. Actually, both forms are equivalent by replacing the utility function in [15] with u i − u 0 i . The subtlety between the two definitions is due to a key difference between innetwork caching and traffic engineering. In traffic engineering, a flow's utility may reduce to zero given no bandwidth is allocated. Nonetheless, in in-network caching, the bottom line is "stopping collaboration but using local cache", which would not drag a node's utility to zero. By setting u 0 i to the utility of merely using a local cache, definition 7 guarantees that nobody gets worse off after collaboration. On the other hand, setting u 0 i to zero indicates "full obedience" which may result in performance decrease of certain individuals in collaborations. Theorem 1. In a fair collaborative game (Ω, u 0 ), the optimal caching strategy (x * , y * ) achieves PF.
Theorem 2. In a fair collaborative game (Ω, u 0 ) with optimal strategy (x * , y * ), EF is sufficient for MF, i.e. EF ⇒ MF.
In our caching games, PF is naturally guaranteed by NBS as Theorem 1 states. It is also intuitively easy to understand that if a Pareto efficient solution exists and achieves EF, it also achieves MF at the same time, as Theorem 2 states. The proofs of these two theorems are rather trivial therefore are only included in the appendix of our technical report.
IV. SOLVING A FAIR IN-NETWORK CACHING GAME The previous section has formally defined bargaining games, as well as our chosen metric of fairness. We next devise both centralised and decentralised optimal solutions to expose the structure and importance of collaboration between nodes. We use later these optimums to evaluate our heuristic solution, FairCache.
A. Defining a Utility Function
Defining a realistic utility function can be difficult. There are extensive discussions on the trade-off between simplicity and reality. In this paper, we assume that a node's utility generated from serving local demand. This consists of two components. One is from using its local cache and the other is from utilising neighbours' help. More precisely, v i 's utility is defined as:
Both terms show that the utility is a non-decreasing function of demands and content size. The second term shows that the utility of retrieving remote content decreases as the distance increases. It indicates that a node prefers fetching from the closest source to reduce latency and large traffic footprint. Although this utility function is used throughout the paper, this is pluggable, and can be changed between future deployments.
B. Centralised Solution
We begin by outlining the optimal solution, which can be computed centrally (e.g. on a software controller). Without loss of generality, we assume unit object size s k = 1, also let l i,j l * i,j + 1 for simplicity of expression. Plugging in eq. (3), we define the optimisation problem based on the bargaining framework as:
Subject to
Constraint (5) means the content stored at a node cannot exceed its cache capacity. Constraint (7) says v i can retrieve o k from v j only if v j has cached it; it also says v i cannot get more than v j can offer. Constraint (6) simplifies the data scheduling by constraining a node to retrieve a maximum of one complete object in a cache period. Constraints (8) and (9) impose the domain of decision variables. The optimisation problem is a typical Integer Programming program which is NP-Complete. By applying Linear Programming relaxation, we relax constraints (8) and (9) by letting x i,k ∈ [0, 1] and y i,j,k ∈ [0, 1], so the original problem can be transformed into a linear programming problem. One technical detail that needs special caution is the concavity of the object function (4). Generally speaking, the composite of a logarithmic function and an arbitrary function does not necessarily preserve concavity. However, since all the affine functions are log-concave, its composite with logarithmic function preserves concavity as Lemma 1 states. The proof is straightforward and can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 1. The problem (4) is a convex optimisation problem.
The centralised solution can be easily derived by applying standard convex optimisation techniques, as its closed form expression shown in Theorem 3. The proof and actual equation system can be found in appendix. In practice, we can choose any modern LP solver to calculate the solution.
Theorem 3. In a fair collaborative game, for the optimal caching strategy (x * i , y * i ) of node v i , there exist non-negative vectors α 0, β 0, γ 0, δ 0 and λ 0, such that
where
li,j y i,j,k . The solver needs the demand matrix of each cache, cache size, content object set, whole network topology and etc. as inputs. The whole equation system has 3|O| × |V | 2 + 2|O| × |V | + |V | variables and the same number of equations. The computation overhead can be high if the content set and network are large, which motivates us to look for a more scalable distributed algorithm.
C. Distributed Solution
The optimal centralised solution has obvious drawbacks in its actual use. First, it suffers from high computation complexity even with a moderate problem size. Second, it is not robust due to a single point of failure. Third, it is not adaptive under network dynamics. Hence, we next translate the centralised solution into a distributed one by decomposition techniques.
To solve an equation system, each node can be viewed as a subsystem. If they simply optimise locally, all the calculations in each subsystem are independent from those in others. However, due to collaboration, there are variables and constraints, which are referred to as complicating variables and constraints [19] , make such calculations dependent and couple a subsystem with others. In problem (4), the only complicating constraint is (7) which couples a node with its neighbours. To decompose the objective function, we first rewrite original problem (2) into its equivalent convex form.
Then we apply Lagrangian dual relaxation. Lagrangian dual relaxation provides a non-trivial lower-bound of a primal; the difference between the dual and the primal is called duality gap. The duality gap can be zero if certain conditions are met as we show below. The Lagrangian
associated with objective (12) is defined as follows.
λ 0 is the dual variable associated with constraint (7) of objective (12) . Then the Lagrangian dual function d(·) : R |O||V | 2 → R is as follows:
Given λ, let x * and y * be the unique minimizers for the Lagrangian (13) over all x and y. Then the dual function (14) can be rewritten as d(λ) = L(x * , y * , λ). By maximising the dual function, we can reduce the duality gap. The Lagrangian dual problem of the primal (12) is defined as follows
The constraints for the dual problem are the same as those of the primal except constraint (7) which has already been included in the dual objective function. Given the assumptions we made in previous sections, we know there exists a solution (x, y) ∈ relint(D) satisfying all the constraints. Because the objective function (12) is convex and all the constraints (5)(6) (8) and (9) are affine, Slater's condition holds, and the duality gap is zero. Thus, when the dual problem (15) reaches its maximum, the primal problem also reaches its minimum. The optimal solution for primal problem (12) can be derived from the optimal solution for dual problem (15) . After decomposition, each node v i now only needs to optimise its utility locally for a given λ by calculating
We use standard projected subgradient method [19] to derive the distributed collaborative algorithm. Let h(λ) and ∂d(λ) denote the subgradient and subdifferential of dual function d(·) at point λ respectively. Then for every h i,j,k ∈ h(λ) we have
Vector h = h(λ) points to the direction where d(·) increases fastest. In each iteration, node v i needs to solve the subsystem (16) to update the dual variable λ. k represents the k th iteration. ξ k is the step-size in the k th iteration which can be determined by several standard methods [?] . Projected subgradient method projects λ on its constraint (i.e. λ 0) in each iteration, and we use (·) + as a shorthand for the Euclidean projection of a point on R
The primal solution can be constructed from the optimum λ * . We refer eq. (16) to as optimal algorithm of the distributed solution for our in-network caching game.
Theorem 4. Optimal algorithm converges to its optimum as the sequence {λ (1) , λ (2) ... λ (k) } converges, if a diminishing step size is used such that lim i→∞ ξ i = 0 and
Above theorem guarantees the convergence. From optimisation, it is not difficult for those who have basic knowledge of Economy and optimisation theory to realise λ i,j,k can be viewed as the "shadow price" of transferring o k from v j to v i , which is a "cost" for v i but an "income" for v j . It is worth emphasising again though the optimal algorithm distributes the calculations over nodes, the overall computations are not reduced. At the same time, the communication cost increases due to exchanging "shadow price" information.
D. Optimal Neighbourhood Radius
For the optimal algorithm to calculate the network-wide optimal solution, we need to preset the neighbourhood radius of every node equal to the network diameter before we start the optimisation process, which, in other words, means that every node has the whole network as its neighbourhood.
However, setting the neighbourhood to the whole network does not necessarily mean that a node has to collaborate with all others in the final solution. After the optimal algorithm converges, a node derives its optimal neighbourhood from y i . The distant nodes are dropped due to the high transmission cost. Essentially, the actual neighbourhood gradually decreases to its optimal value during an optimisation process if we check a node's y i in each iteration.
To investigate the optimal neighbourhood size, we performed some initial experiments, in which, we run the optimal algorithm on different realistic ISP topologies then derive the optimal neighbourhood from y i after convergence. We skip the details of experiment set up here since they are the same as those presented in Section VI. Fig.2a plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of nodes against the optimal neighbourhood. Surprisingly, though each node's search radius is preset to the network diameter, the actual neighbourhood shrinks significantly after convergence. In all ISP networks, over 80% of nodes have a neighbourhood of no more than 3 hops. Fig. 2b shows the CDF of nodes against the distance (in hops) of retrieving a content; note that the content served by local cache is also Optimal neighbourhood radius distribution and hit distribution using the optimal algorithm. The experiments are performed on three realistic ISP network topologies with several cache size configurations. Given the initial search radius preset to the network diameter, the neighbourhood shrinks to its optimum after convergence. In practice, the optimal neighbourhood is small and most content is retrieved from the neighbours within 2 hops.
included (i.e. x = 0). More impressively, at least 60% of the non-local content is served by the directly-connect neighbours in both 2 GB and 4 GB cases; only minuscule amount is retrieved from the neighbours further than 2 hops. The result also indicates the optimal neighbourhood gets even smaller with larger caches. Fig. 2c plots a heatmap of the percent of served content as a function of both search radius and cache size on Sprint network. x-axis is the cache size and y-axis is the search radius, numbers on the grid represent the fraction of the content served. Given a cache size configuration, the fraction of served content drops quickly as distance increases. However, increasing cache size also increases the fraction of locally served content (i.e. at y = 0), but reduces the need of collaboration. The results strongly indicate that the collaboration is highly localised in a small neighbourhood due to the highly skewed content popularity distribution. In other words, if non-local content is popular enough to be worth fetching remotely, it is highly likely to discover it in the nearby neighbours.
Content overlapping calculates the percent of same content in two different caches, it is an indicator of content diversity in cache networks. We also examined the average content overlapping among the caches and noticed another interesting phenomenon -content overlapping positively correlates to the cache size configuration. E.g., the average overlapping is 37.8% for 2 GB cache size configuration, and 62.3% for 4 GB. Namely, there is less content overlapping with small cache size configuration since the nodes need more collaboration from each other to improve their performance. Therefore there is a high degree of content diversity in the neighbourhood. With big caches, every node can practically store most of the popular content hence requires less help from the neighbours, which further renders a high degree of content overlapping. In essence, this phenomenon is consistent with our understanding from the experiments in Fig. 2c .
E. Communication Overhead of the Optimal Algorithm
In the optimal algorithm, every node has the whole network as its neighbourhood. Larger neighbourhood improves a node's knowledge on the content distribution, which further helps in making better caching decisions. However, larger neighbourhood inevitably introduces higher communication overhead.
The communication overhead due to calculating λ originate from two parts. The first part is induced by replying the queries from the nodes having v i in their neighbourhood. The second part is induced by collecting information from the nodes in v i 's own neighbourhood. The overhead, denoted as ∆, is proportional to the number of exchanged messages which is again a function of neighbourhood size.
The reason for the factor 1 2 in eq. (17) is because each message will be counted twice, i.e. double counting. Eq. (17) shows that the overall overhead is proportional to the aggregated neighbourhood size of all nodes. Therefore, to derive the optimal solution for the whole network, the overhead of optimal algorithm equals Θ(|O| · ∀i∈V |V |) = Θ(|O| · |V | 2 ). As we can see, even with medium search radius, such overhead is non-trivial.
V. FAIRCACHE: A LOW-COMPLEXITY HEURISTIC DESIGN
Essentially, the distributed algorithm above is equivalent to the centralised solution except that the computations are distributed over all the nodes. The efficiency is gained at the price of high communication overheads, denoted as ∆. Our previous analysis shows that ∆ is proportional to both content set size and aggregated neighbourhood size as ∆ ∝ |O| · ∀i∈V |N i |. To achieve the optimum, we need to set every radius r i equal to the network diameter, leading to ∆ ∝ |O| · |V | 2 , which are unacceptably high overheads given large content set and network. In the following, we propose a low-complexity heuristic to reduce such overheads.
A. Overview of Heuristics
To understand the rationality behind our heuristic, we first give a verbal explanation on the mechanisms of the distributed algorithm expressed in eq. (16) . Recall λ represents the shadow price of transmitting an object between two nodes. Each node hence maintains a list of prices of any given object from any given node. In each iteration of the optimisation (e.g. k), a node tries to minimise its total cost using λ (k) . During the optimisation, the node adjusts its local caching strategy (via x i and y i ) and price list on other nodes (via h). In other words, a node may decide to cache an object if it brings significant improvement, or stop retrieving an object from another node due to high cost. At the same time, the node adjusts the price on how to charge its neighbours by offering help. Then the node collects the price adjustments from all others in the network and updates its own list. The procedure will continue until the performance converges based on certain well-defined criteria.
The mechanisms indicate that we can approximate the optimal algorithm in the following ways:
1) Cut out unpopular content: This approximation takes advantage of the highly skewed content popularity distribution. It is well-known that the popularity distribution has a long and heavy tail and most content fall into the tail. Removing the tail can significantly reduce the size of the exchanged message. Meanwhile, the result will not be significantly influenced because of their marginal contribution to the overall utility. 2) Cut out distant nodes: This approximation takes advantage of topological locality. Since the utility of retrieving distant content is a decreasing function of the hop count between two nodes, the value will quickly drop as path length increases. It is more likely to find the requested content in nearby neighbours due to the spatial locality of the content [20] ; removing remote nodes should not have significant impact on the result. 3) Reverse direction: This approximation takes advantage of the behaviours of the gradient method. In the distributed algorithm, the neighbourhood gradually shrinks from the network diameter to its optimum (as a result of reducing the cost utility function). However, most elements in y i are already set to zero by the gradient method in the beginning phase of the optimisation. Exchanging messages between nodes that are certainly not going to collaborate is a pure waste of resources. By growing the neighbourhood set outwardly, instead of shrinking it, we can avoid unnecessary message exchange. These heuristics were derived by performing extensive simulations, which confirmed their efficacy. We do not include results here due to space constraints. However, let |Ō| denote the average number of objects cached at each router, and |N | denote the average neighbourhood size, the overheads of heuristic ∆ ∝ |Ō| · |N | · |V |. The ratio of overheads between using the optimal and heuristic, i.e. |O| and |N | |V |, therefore it is easy to see the huge reduction in overheads by using heuristic.
B. FairCache Algorithm
We embed the above heuristics in our algorithm, FairCache, presented in Algorithm 1. It takes several inputs. w is the local demand matrix. r is for tracking the current number of hops that defines a node's neighbourhood radius. θ is used Caching decision x i 8:
Collaboration decision y i 9: while θ ≥ θ and r < network diameter do 10: r = r + 1; k = 0;
11:
while k < k stop do 12: x i , y i = arg min x,y L i (x, y, λ) Update θ with current improvement 19: end while for recording the utility improvement by increasing the radius from r to r+1, while θ is the threshold below which FairCache should stop growing the neighbourhood size. λ is the list for tracking the shadow prices; this needs to be exchanged amongst nodes (via price adjustment h) in a neighbourhood.
To apply the approximations, for node v i , instead of making a complete price list, λ, containing all the content and nodes in the network, node v i makes a partial λ which only includes: (i) the most popular content that can be fit into its local cache (i.e. heuristic (i)); and (ii) the nodes in the neighbourhood defined by r (i.e. heuristic (ii)). It is possible that v i observes other content in the h j , collected from neighbours while r grows (i.e. heuristic (iii)), then v i dynamically adds those content into its own λ. v i can also remove items from λ if they are too expensive to retrieve. After local optimising in each iteration, the price adjustment h will be trimmed before exchange by removing information that is not included in λ; and removing the unchanged items, i.e. the zero values. Essentially, v i only exchanges the trimmed h within its neighbourhood and λ only contains the aggregated popular content in the neighbourhood. Obviously, these approximations render incomplete information (due to removing unpopular content and distant nodes). To handle the missing λ i,j,k in the local optimisation, we let missing λ i,j,k = ∞ (i = j), which indicates that the optimisation algorithm should neither exchange unpopular content nor exchange content with distant nodes.
Looking more closely, FairCache consists of two loops. The outer loop (line 9-19) increases the search radius r by one hop in each iteration. The outer loop stops when the current improvement, θ , drops below the threshold θ (i.e. θ < θ) due to enlarging the neighbourhood. The inner loop (line 11-17) finishes the local optimisation which is the calculations in Eq. (16) for the given neighbourhood defined by the current radius r. The communication overhead come from the operation in line 14 which collects the price adjustments h j from the neighbourhood N i . Line 15 adjusts the local shadow price list and updates the λ by removing or adding items.
VI. FAIRCACHE EVALUATION A. Methodology
To evaluate FairCache, we perform extensive simulations using the LiteLab platform [21] . We use several topologies. First, we use real topologies collected by the Rocketfuel project [22] ; namely, two ISP router-level topologies: Sprint (604 nodes, 2,279 edges) and AT&T (631 nodes, 2,078 edges). Second, we use traces from Guifi [23] . Guifi is the largest open wireless community mesh network in the world. It allows any user to purchase equipment and become part of the network. We use its core network topology in the Catalunya region (735 nodes, 1,059 edges). Third, to allow us to vary key graph parameters, we also generate synthetic networks based on two models: the Barabási-Albert (BA) model and the Erdős-Rényi (ER) model. Four parameter sets are used for these synthetic networks: {BA 1 : m = 2}, {BA 2 : m = 4}, {ER 1 : p = 1.1 · log(n)/n} and {ER 2 : p = 1.5 · log(n)/n}. For each topology we attach a single client to each edge router (i.e. with degree of 1). This results in 161 clients in Sprint; 207 clients in AT&T; and 200 in Guifi. We then randomly select between 10 and 20 distinct routers to attach a source to. Each router is then allocated a given cache capacity, which we vary; the default is 4 GB, which is < 0.1% of the corpus.
Using the above topologies, clients generate requests at each simulation tick, which are then routed through the network to either a content source or an intermediate cache based on the strategy employed. We base our content set on the Youtube trace from [24] . This contains 1,687,506 objects (average size is 8.0 MB and aggregated size is 12.87 TB). We use the view count information to fit a Zipf (α) distribution (α = 0.9537) to model the overall content popularity. To explore the impact of different request patterns, we also perform sensitivity analysis on α. Throughout this section, we use our distributed optimal algorithm (i.e. Eq. (16)) as an optimal benchmark to compare FairCache against. Each result is averaged over 50 runs; errorbars are not plotted if they are sufficiently small (< 5%).
B. Scalability
We begin by exploring the scalability of FairCache. We measure this as the convergence rate for FairCache, i.e. how many iterations it takes the algorithm to fully allocate which cache should store which object. Fewer iterations indicate that higher dynamics can be tolerated (e.g. more frequent topology changes, new objects being introduced or cache updates). Fig. 3a compares the convergence rates of the optimal (the upper figure) and FairCache (the lower figure) on the real ISP and community (Guifi.net) topologies. It is easy to see that the optimal needs significantly longer time to converge than Faircache. We also notice that larger cache size also lead to longer convergence time, as more state must be exchanged between nodes.
To investigate how network size impacts the convergence rate, we perform the same evaluation on synthetic topologies by using 4 GB cache and growing the network size step by step. Fig. 3a plots the results. As we can see, the lines in Figure 3a are clearly divided into two groups -the upper one is the optimal (with hollow markers) and the lower one is FairCache (with filled markers). For both optimal and FairCache, the convergence rate degrades as the network size grows. Though the increase in convergence time grows sublinearly for both algorithms, FairCache is obviously more scalable than the optimal. We must acknowledge that mapping the number of iterations to actual running time per se is a hard problem. Especially, in each iteration, as shown in the following section, the optimal generates much more traffic than FairCache. If we run the algorithms in the background by limiting the size of control messages sent out per unit time (to avoid congestions), then the optimal takes even longer time. Therefore, one-hour convergence time for FairCache can mean days for the optimal, even though there might be only 80% increase regarding the number of iterations.
We also measure FairCache's scalability by its traffic overheads. Clearly, it is undesirable to require large amounts of control message volume. In this experiment, we measure the aggregate size of control messages for both the distributed optimal and FairCache as C O and C F respectively. We then calculate the traffic reduction as
. Figure 3c presents a box plot of the results for both BA 1 (upper boxes) and ER 1 (lower boxes) models. BA 1 has slightly higher reduction than ER 1 . It shows that FairCache is able to achieve over 80% traffic reduction even on small networks of 100 nodes. As the network size increases, the benefit of using FairCache becomes more obvious. In a network of 900 nodes, Faircache attains 95% reductions. This equates to significant traffic volumes; in one iteration a 500 node network and a small 10 3 -item content set can save 887 MB of control traffic via FairCache, leaving only 66.8 MB. On average, each node only introduces about 136 KB communication overhead in each iteration. We can therefore combine the above message overhead and convergence measurements to calculate the convergence time. If we configure the rate of control messages to 100 KB/s, FairCache takes 11 minutes to bootstrap. This is just 4.6% of the time taken by the distributed optimal algorithm. Given a saturated 54 Mbit link, the FairCache control messages would consume just 1.4% of traffic. Importantly, this is only a bootstrap process; changes in request patterns are addressed with low cost updates within each node's neighbourhood. Even in highly dynamic situations, these updates constitute under 10 KB/s. Moreover, using FairCache, the growth of overhead is mostly bounded by the cache size instead of the content size, making it a more scalable solution.
C. Accuracy
The previous section has shown that FairCache significantly reduces the convergence time and messaging overhead of fairly allocating caching responsibilities. These improvements, however, potentially come at the cost of accuracy (i.e. lower utility). We next inspect the accuracy sacrifice required to obtain these improvements.
To measure the accuracy of FairCache, we compare it against the optimal distributed algorithm. We first run the optimal algorithm and measure the utility u i for every node i. Similarly, we run FairCache and measure the utility u i . We then calculate the accuracy of FairCache as its ratio to the optimal for every node, i.e. ,
ui . Figure 3d plots the per node CDF of this ratio. For two Rocketfuel networks, we can see that FairCache achieves very high accuracy. For large networks like Guifi, all the nodes achieve an accuracy of over 92%. For medium size networks like Sprint, all the nodes have at least 97% accuracy and about 50% of the nodes reach 100% accuracy. We also measure the aggregated accuracy using i u i i ui . The aggregate accuracy is always above 95% and may slightly degrade as the network size increases (i.e. decrease by 3% from Sprint to Guifi). Regarding the actual caching performance, the results also show that 5% drop in accuracy leads to roughly 3% -4% decrease in average hit rates in the network, which is almost negligible.
The results confirm the rationale behind the heuristics used by FairCache. The approximation introduces almost negligible degradation in the accuracy. The main reason is that the highly skewed content popularity distribution means that the bulk of caching decisions are limited to the most popular objects. This means that FairCache can attain high accuracy without requiring to share information about all objects (unlike the optimal solution).
D. Price of Fairness
FairCache aims to realise fair collaborations among nodes, which clearly could causes a degradation in aggregated utility. We use the Price of Fairness (PoF) to measure the loss in utility due to Faircache. The PoF is calculated as the ratio between the aggregated utilities of all nodes using FairCache and the global optimal that does not consider fairness [18] . A higher PoF value indicates a larger sacrifice in utility in order to achieve fairness in the network. Figure 4a and Figure 4b plot the results of using both realistic and synthetic networks with three caching size configurations. Both figures convey the same information, which is that PoF increases as network size increases. PoF value can be as high as 20% in large networks, e.g. Guifi. This is not negligible, but is likely not significant enough to dissuade caches who are interested in fairness from using FairCache.
Interesting, our results also show that increasing the cache size is a very effective way to ameliorate the loss in efficiency. In Figure 4a , a 4 GB cache significantly reduces the PoF. Using 2 GB cache, the PoF increases 11% when the network size increases from 100 to 900, whereas the PoF only increases 3% if 4 GB cache is used. In Figure 4b , there is only slight increases in PoF comparing Guifi to Sprint. Moreover, comparing to 2 GB cache, 4 GB cache improves PoF over 57% in Guifi network, indicating that the positive effect of large cache is more noticeable in large networks. Overall, we believe that an average PoF of < 8% is a cost considered worth paying for those concerned by a need for fairness (by noticing the almost negligible difference between Global and FairCache in Fig.4c 4d regarding BHR and FPR, even though the Fig.4b indicates PoF is about 8%).
E. Caching Performance
We have previously noted that utility is reduced by considering fairness. Next, we explore caching performance from the percpective of two traditional caching metrics: byte hitrate (BHR) and footprint reduction (FPR). BHR is a conventional metric to measure saving on inter-domain traffic, while FPR is the reduction on the product of traffic volume and distance which measures saving on network traffic.
To evaluate FairCache, we compare its performance against two other strategies: (i) Greedy, which computes the local optimal for each caches without collaboration; and (ii) Global, which maximises the aggregated utility of all caches. Figure 4c and Figure 4d plot the results on the three ISP networks using 4 GB cache. Natually, in Figure 4c , we can see that Global achieves the best BHR in all cases due the fact that maximises the overall network as a whole. That said, FairCache only performs slightly worse than than Global, with a 5% to 10% performance degradation in each case. Compared to Greedy, FairCache is consistently superior with at least 28% improvement. This shows that, regardless of fairness, FairCache can offer significant performance improvements over local algorithms (note that Greedy is the locally optimal, and is therefore the theoretical upper bound of algorithm such as Least Recently Used).
When inspecting the traffic footprint reduction, performance is even higher. FairCache is superior in all networks. Although Fig. 4 : FairCache achieves the fairness by trading off some efficiency. However, large cache size can effectively reduce PoF. In reality, FairCache is able to achieve very similar performance as Global, and is consistently superior to Greedy in all cases. the reasons are intuitive for Greedy, which sees nodes locally optimising, it is more surprising in Global. The reason is that FairCache only requests from nearby caches (limited by r). In contrast, Global uses any node in the network. This increases hit rates, but results in more traffic. (a) Cumulative distribution of utilities.
Log betweenness centrality To have a closer look at the performance of each individual cache, we select the AT&T network topology and study the utility distribution in the network (i.e. how are traffic savings distributed across caches). Figure 5a plots the CDF of normalised utility values across each node (normalised by the top value per simulation). By comparing Greedy and FairCache, we see that every node gets better off through collaboration using FairCache. On the other hand, the Global strategy intersects with both Greedy and FairCache, i.e. some caches in Global get lower utility than Greedy. The area between the lines indicate the percentage of caches that are worse off due to global optimisation. The Global strategy leads to 13% of nodes getting worse off compared to Greedy, and 20% comparing to FairCache. Again, regarding the aggregated utility, Global is only about 5% better than Faircache. Figure 5b shows the log-log plot of nodes' normalised utility as a function of betweenness centrality [9] . Nodes with a high betweeness exist on the shortest path that links many other nodes (e.g. a core router); nodes with a low betweeness do not sit on such paths, and are often found at the edge of the network. Interestingly, when nodes use the Global strategy, a node's utility strongly correlates with its position in the network: core nodes gain the highest utility. In contrast, FairCache significantly weakness this correlation. This is an attractive property as it means that utility is also increased at the low betweeness (i.e. edge) caches. As well as improving the concept of fairness, this has other attractive benefits. Most notably, by pushing utility away from the core and towards the edge, load in the backbone network can be decreased, and consumers can gain lower delay access to object. This also sheds light on our earlier results in regardless traffic reductions, as it reveals that hits are pushed closer to clients.
F. Request Locality
FairCache approximates the distributed optimal algorithm with three heuristics presented in Section V-A. The heuristics takes advantages of the highly skewed spatial locality and temporal locality. FairCache has achieved good performance with realistic settings in our previous discussion. A natural question, however, is how these localities impact the algorithm regarding its behaviours and performance. To explore this, we perform sensitivity analysis across these two parameter ranges to measure the robustness of our heuristics.
Here, we solely present the Guifi topology due to space constraints. The reason we select Guifi is that the dataset contains geographical coordinates of each node, allowing much more fine grained analysis of spatial concerns. We have confirmed that the results are representative of the other topologies too. We use a Hawkes process-based algorithm [20] to generate a collective user request trace. The algorithm is controlled by two parameters: a content popularity skewness α and a spatial locality factor β. α controls the overall content popularity which follows Zipf (α). The spatial locality factor, β = 0, indicates the request pattern reduces to a Independent Reference Model, while β = 1 indicates very high spatial localisation. Since each request is assigned a pair of coordinates, with which the request can be further associated with the closest node in the Euclidean space [20] . Then the demand matrices can be derived.
First, we inspect the sensitivity of the caching performance metrics. Figure 6 presents the results by varying both α and β in (0, 1]. From Figure 6a and 6b, we can observe a slow but steady improvement on byte hit rate and footprint reduction as β increases. Specifically, both increase by about 6% and 8% respectively when increasing β from 0.1 to 1. This indicates that spatial locality is not a critical requirement for FairCache. Fig. 6 : Experiments on the Guifi network, 4 GB cache size. We vary both temporal locality factor α and spatial locality factor β from 0.1 to 1. We observe a gradual and slow improvement in caching performance as spatial locality factor increases. Both spatial and temporal locality have significant impacts on traffic reduction.
On the other hand, temporal locality α has a more significant impact on the accuracy and message reduction of FairCache. Figure 6c shows that the average accuracy of FairCache improves from 85% to 97% by increasing α from 0.2 to 1. It is also worth noting that the speed of degradation of accuracy by decreasing α slows down at certain point (i.e. α = 0.4). The reason is because the general popularity distribution gets closer to a uniform distribution (due to small α), items are randomly requested due to the absence of popularity skewness, which indicates that each item has a similar utility when being cached. Interestingly, this means the overall utility of a cache will not vary too much, though the solution can be quite different from the optimal one.
Last, we inspect the messaging overhead of running FairCache, presented as the reduction in comparison to the distributed optimal solution again. In Figure 6d , we see that both α and β have a notable impact. Higher α and β both result in lower overhead (i.e. higher reductions). The reason is that a smaller α value leads to a more uniform popularity distribution, which makes the demand matrices deviate more from each other, which further leads to larger exchanged messages for λ values. The smaller β values have almost the same effect on demand matrices as that of α. However, we also notice that β has more significant impacts when α is small.
VII. RELATED WORK
This paper covers several topics like game theory, optimisation and caching. Each has a long history and a large body of literature. We constrain our discussion on the related work within the context of collaborative caching.
Caching is a popular technique to improve system performance in various context. It is interesting to mention there are two diametrically opposed viewpoints on collaborative caching in ICN community. On one hand, [25] , [26] hold a sceptical stance on the general in-network caching approaches. On the other hand, evidence in [5] , [8] - [12] , [27] - [29] show that collaborations indeed significantly improve cache performance. The opposing viewpoints are likely due to the different assumptions and modelling methods. Most recent collaborative caching algorithms are either limited by a centralised solver which makes scalability difficult in reality, or limited by a distributed heuristic which often neither guarantees global optimum nor Pareto efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work in ICN has tried to solve the collaborative caching as a bargaining game and devise a low-complexity heuristic to embrace both efficiency and fairness.
Game theory is an effective tool to analyse the effects of individual behaviours on a system. Recent work like [4] , [30] - [33] apply game theory to study in-network caching problem. The caching problem is modelled as non-cooperative, pure strategic games and the equilibrium is analysed. In all the formulations, this line of research shares a common utilitarian view and only concerns about the global optimum which is an indicator of the efficiency of a cache system. Fairness, however, is unfortunately overlooked by the prior work. Without coordination, selfishness, driving nodes to act alone to pursue self-interest, is studied in [4] , [30] , [32] regarding how it impacts the equilibrium and system efficiency (measured by Price of Anarchy). Moreover, these work also show that the global optimum is seldom achieved due to lack of coordination and nodes' inherent selfishness. Nonetheless, most prior work are limited by various over-simplifications for the purpose of theoretical analysis (e.g. single or a small set of objects, complete graph, global knowledge and etc. ), which brings scalability and applicability into question in a practical setting and algorithm implementations.
Our paper differentiates itself from the prior work in the following perspectives. First, in-network caching problem is modelled as a Nash bargaining game and is solved under axiomatic game theory framework. Second, instead of focusing on the global optimum, we consider selfishness as nodes' inherent nature and the algorithm aims to incentivise the collaboration among nodes to achieve Pareto efficiency based on the well-defined fairness. Third, to enable the practical use, we apply several approximation techniques in designing our heuristic to make it suitable for large-scale use.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To date, studies of ICN caching have focussed on traditional metrics such as hit rate, assuming that nodes are happy to contribute to achieving a global optimum. In this paper, we have argued that practical situations are unlikely to adhere to this model. Instead, caches operated by separate stakeholders will expect a reasonable level of fairness, where they are not penalised for cooperating with others in collaborative caching algorithms. We began by delineating an optimal solution, that ensures no node attains lower utility by collaborating. To address the high complexity of the solution, we also proposed a heuristic algorithm, FairCache, which achieves high performance, at the fraction of the cost. Importantly, unlike past work, Faircache offers Pareto efficiency and proportional fairness, ensuring that all nodes are incentivised to collaborate. We have comprehensively evaluated FairCache to confirm its efficacy in several different environments, including both wirelines ISPs and community mesh networks. Through our design and evaluation of FairCache, we have also discovered several important factors pertaining to collaborative caching more generally. Our analysis has showed that increasing the number of collaborative partners generates exponentially increasing overheads. Whilst this could be anticipated, we also note that the benefits (e.g. traffic reductions) disappear rapidly as the neighbourhood size grows.
There are a number of avenues of future work. So far, we have assumed that all nodes run the same prescribed algorithm. In reality, there might be deviant nodes who simply do not run FairCache. Investigating the impact of running different algorithms within one network is a ripe area of work. Although we have explored a number of realistic scenarios, another important point of future work is expanding our evaluation. Most prominently, we plan to explore the impact of dynamics on FairCache, e.g. rapid changes in topology and content interests. Lastly, we wish to expand FairCache to consider situations in which caches have external influences (e.g. business arrangements) that modify their behaviour. As of yet, little work has considered exogenous incentives that drive caching collaboration. We therefore see this as a fruitful line of study. Proof: Instead of directly proving that "EF is sufficient for MF in a fair collaborative game (Ω, u 0 )", we first prove that "EF is sufficient for KS fairness". Recall that KS optimises the players of the worst utility, hence KS fairness refers to the strategy that maximises the minimum utility in a game.
We prove the theorem by contradiction. Let's assume solution (x * , y * ) is egalitarian fair, but not KS fair. u * is the corresponding utility value.
Let's further assume another solution (x , y ) = (x * , y * ) which achieves KS fairness, and u is its utility value. In a fair collaborative game, based on the nature of Nash bargaining framework, both (x , y ) and (x * , y * ) are Pareto optimal.
By definition, KS fair solution indicates that 
Inequality (21) contradicts with the fact that (x * , y * ) is Pareto optimal. So the assumption does not hold. (x * , y * ) must be both egalitarian fair and KS fair.
Because (x * , y * ) is already a Pareto optimal solution, both MF and KS are the same. Therefore, in a fair collaborative game (Ω, u 0 ), EF is sufficient for MF. I.e., EF ⇒ M F .
C. Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof: The proof is trivial. Since U i in eq. (3) is affine and positive, non-negative weighted sum of U i is still affine and positive. All the affine functions are log-concave. So the objective function (4) is concave.
In addition, all the constraints (5)(6)(7)(8) and (9) are affine. Therefore, problem (4) is a convex optimisation problem. Note we dropped constraints x i,j ≥ 0 and y i,j,k ≤ 1 in making the Lagrangian because constraints (6) and (7) make them redundant. In the following derivation, we let τ i,k = U i −u 
Similarly, we can derive the optimal y * i,j,k as x * i,k . The optimal caching strategy (x * , y * ) of the network can be derived by solving the equation system (22) for all the nodes.
E. Proof of Theorem 4.
Proof:
To prove convergence, we first prove the gradient of the dual function is bounded by a constant K, namely the dual function d(λ) is K-Lipschitz continuous. Second, we show that given the diminishing step size, the Euclidean distance between the optimum d(λ * ) and the best value d(λ • ) achieved in all previous iterations converges to zero in limit.
Since the primal (12) is strictly convex and all constraints are linear, dual d(λ) is strictly concave and differentiable. ∂d(λ) ∂λ i,j,k = y i,j,k − x i,k =⇒ ∂d(λ) ∂λ i,j,k ≤ 1
